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Abstract 
The majority of experts agree that taxes are distortionary in nature. This is relatively 
true for all of the different groups of taxes, but for the corporate taxes is exceptionally 
obvious. The existence of corporate taxes can affect the company’s behavior in a 
number of ways and one of them is the distortion of choice of the sources of finance. 
As it is known, companies usually face 2 different financial alternatives to cover their 
investment opportunities: debt and equity (new equity issues or alternatively, retained 
earnings). According to the principles of corporate taxation, since interest payments 
are in fact tax deductible from the corporate income tax base, the debt source of finance 
is commonly considered as tax preferred as compared to the equity source of finance. 
Similarly, retained earnings are more preferred to new equities since capital gains are 
usually taxed upon realization or eventually exempted from taxation when reinvested. 
The theory suggests many varieties of corporate tax systems that sustain relative 
capacities to offset the excessive burden on the external equity supported investments 
and thus, eliminate the debt-equity related distortions. From the wider literature offer, 
we chose to examine the comprehensive business income tax system (CBIT), a 
proposal of the US Treasury Department and compare it with the basic “classical” 
approach in corporate taxation. The intention is to explore its properties from the view 
of neutrality and the allocation criteria, for which purpose the basic methodology of 
EMTR is additionally modified and extended. We hope to prove that this corporate 
system has justified its reputation in the sphere of our interest. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, we’ve described and explained the distortions that usually arise from the isolated 
implementation of corporate taxes, a condition which assumes total abstraction of the personal 
taxes. In this article, we also include the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore 
the investment decision, not only from the company’s perspective, but from the shareholder’s 
point of view as well, a condition commonly referred as “double taxation”. This phenomenon is 
granted to fact that the corporate tax base (i.e. the corporate income) cannot be limited only at 
the corporation observed as a form of legal entity. Usually, under the classical corporation tax 
 
regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate profits are distributed to the 
shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are subject to 
additional taxation at personal level.  
The ultimate consequence of the referred phenomenon is imposition of an additional “extra” 
burden on total corporate profit expressed integrally from its source to its destination. 
Respecting that this “excessive” taxation of the profit is considered unfair and could distort the 
economic activity of firms, the authorities try to construct more appropriate “neutral” tax 
systems with attributions to effectively tax the economic rents (or the extra profit) and at the 
same time avoid taxation of the normal return. In addition, we give a brief literature review to 
some integrated modalities of corporate tax systems with the desired properties, which actually 
allow a higher degree of neutrality in corporate taxation. The following tax systems are 
protagonists proposals of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development), as a part of the tax reform that was undergone recently, acknowledged as more 
convenient to eliminate the difference between debt and equity associated with the classical 
approach of corporate taxation: the Full Integration Tax System (FIT), the Allowance for 
Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE), the Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax System (ASE), 
the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) etc. 
It is a commonly known truth that borrowed capital is a superior source of finance from the 
taxpayer’s point of view, as a result of the usual and widely excepted treatment of interest 
payments. In practice, since companies are allowed to deduct interest payments from their 
corporate income tax base, the system subsidizes the debt source finance in a manner that 
the action reduces the opportunity cost (the discount rate) of the debt-financed investment. 
This gives a certain advantage to the debt finance, since it is tax preferred in front of equity, 
which oppositely is fully taxed. The last triggers unfavourable behaivour of the company, to 
use more borrowed capital, thus increasing the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. 
The last presents the most common and typical distortion of corporate finance, induced by the 
traditional, “classical” treatment of corporate profit. But, as mentioned above, the leading 
economic organizations such as the OECD, have made a break-through in the sphere of 
business taxation, proposing some alternative models of hybrid tax systems, that are much or 
less distinctive from the classical approach and more evenly allocate the burden across the 
different sources of finance, for example such as the CBIT system. Initially developed and 
proposed by the US Treasury Department, and after accepted and promoted by the OECD, 
this regime successfully eliminates the need for integration between the corporate and 
personal taxes on equity by imposing a restriction on the possibility to deduct the interest 
payments. In fact, interest income is no longer deductible from the corporate income tax base 
and at the same time is exempt from taxation at personal level. The result should be neutrality 
and indifference between debt and equity.  
 
2. Modifying the Basic Methodological Frame 
We pay our attention in this first from the following series of articles, exclusively on the 
investments financed with new equity issues (external equity). As we know from business 
practice, equities could be found in 2 (two) fundamental forms: external equity (new equity 
issues), which provides the equity capital for the ongoing projects externally, through issues of 
the new company’s shares on the capital market; and retained earnings (retentions of profit), 
which are formed from the company’s accumulated (non-distributed) profit, usually subject of 
reinvestment. The models of taxation discussed in this article, could be easily applied in the 
investment scenario covered with retained earnings as well, of course modified with its specific 
circumstances. With the purpose to achieve more detailed, systematic approach in exploration 
of the attributions and specificities of the models, we decided to study them separately, and 
dedicate this article only for the new equity finance. Other reasons for this are the limited space, 
minimizing the risk for confusion, and providing a better comparison of the effects. The basic 
methodology is consisted of the effective marginal tax rates analytical frame (EMTR), which is 
additionally modified and extended to express all the newly occurred conditions that define 
 
“double” taxation of corporate profit. With the adapted methodology of EMTR, we have 
managed to identify and explain many varieties of integrated tax systems that sustain some 
relative (theoretical) capacities to offset the excessive burden on the external equity supported 
investment. Here, we present in detail only the Comprehensive Business Income Tax System 
(CBIT) and compare it with the basic Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT). 
To recall, according to Devereux & Griffith [1], [2], [3], the effective marginal tax rate is defined 
as: 
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In order to isolate the pure effects that arise from the imposition of the code, as well as to 
simplify the calculation for the purpose of a better illustration of the effects, once again, we 
suggest the following assumptions: the net-present value of depreciation allowancess is 
asumed 0 (A = 0), there is no inflation in the economy (π = 0, ρ = r), the rate of economic 
depreciation is assumed 0 (δ = 0) and the real interest rate is positive (r > 0). If we consider 
the previous assumptions and label md as the personal tax rate on dividend income, z as the 
effective personal tax rate on capital gains,  mi as the personal tax rate on interest income and 
c as the tax credit rate allowed for dividends paid, then the tax discrimination variable requires 
the form of: 
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The shareholder’s discount rate transforms to: 
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And the general form of the cost of capital rearranges to: 
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Recognizing the fact that under existence of personal taxes, the financial constraints variable 
FNE when the project is financed with new equities is measured as: 
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Derives a cost of capital for this alternative investment of: 
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While under the same conditions, the financial constarints variable FDE when the project is 
financed with debt: 
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Generates a cost of capital for the debt-financed investment alternative of: 
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Before we proceed, we’d like to reffer to our main analitical tool, and that is, the investment tax 
wedge coefficient defined as (p~ – r).  Depending on the relation between the cost of capital p~ 
and the real interest rate r, we can distinct 3 different conditions. The first condition is when 
the effective tax burden is positive (p~> r) and as a result of that, the tax system depresses the 
investment activities. In terms of integrated taxation of company‘s income, this means that 
both, the ecomonic rent and the normal return are effectivelly taxed. The second condition is 
when the effective tax burden is equal to 0 (p~ = r), when the tax system is neutral to the 
investment decision. In other words, under these conditions, the normal return of corporate 
profit is left from taxation and only the extra profit is being subject to taxation. And the third and 
the most preferrable condition from the investor’s point of view is when the effective tax burden 
is negative (p~< r), when the tax system supports the overall investment. Here, the investment 
is being effectivelly „subsidized“ by the system, enabling the investor to legaly escape from 
taxation a rate of return higher than the normal rate of return. In perfect economies without 
presence of taxes, the cost of capital is identical with the real interest rate (p~= r) and the 
economic agents are completely indifferent between the investment decision and the decision 
to save. The existence of the national tax system diverges the difference between the cost of 
capital and the interest rate and therefore creates a positive tax wedge (p~> r). 
3. The Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT) 
First, we’d like to introduce the so-called „classical“ approach in corporate taxation, which has 
been traditionally the most used and widelly practiced form of corporate tax. Actually, the 
classical system posts a true representation of what is known as „double“ taxation and a 
classical example of the pure separate taxation of corporate income. It will serve as a baseline 
model for comparison of the CBIT system discussed futherlly. So, what is the classical 
corporate income tax system? 
Basically, the CCT is a rudimentary form of corporate tax that treats the corporate income in a 
conservative and fundamental way. It’s a system of taxing companies in which the company is 
treated as a taxable entity separate from its own shareholders. The profits of companies under 
this system are therefore taxed twice, first when made by the company and again when 
distributed to the shareholders as dividends and capital gains. Formally, there is no integration 
at all between the corporate and personal income tax under the CCT system. In the essence 
of the Classical Corporation Tax is double taxation of corporate income. As stated by 
Harberger [4], „Such a tax system discriminates against the incorporation of business ideas, 
restrains the supply of equity finance necessary for their economic utilisation, reallocates 
resources from the corporate sector to the unincorporated one and thus causes an efficiency 
loss to the whole economy”. That’s why, according to Kari and Yla-Liedenpohja [5], “The need 
 
to eliminate these drawbacks led to tax reforms aimed at integrating the taxation of 
corporations and their owners”. So, how could we express the true nature of this typical form 
of corporate tax and illustrate the effects from it in terms of the proposed methodology? 
Technically speaking, as described by Devereux and Griffith [6], “A Classical System makes 
no allowance for “double” taxation, so that dividend income is subject to corporate income tax 
and taxed again as personal income”.  The authorities impose the corporate tax at the 
corporate level differently from the personal taxes at the stockholder level and at the same 
time do not allow any tax credit on dividend distributions (c = 0). Usually, the combination of 
the levels (percentage points) of the different tax rates falls under discretion of the policy 
maker. Concidering this, we can identify the CCIT system as (t, md, mi, z, c = 0).  
 
3.1 CCT in debt-financed alternatives 
It is easy recogniozed that the CCT produces a zero investment tax wedge variable if we take 
in account expression [8] that the cost of capital in this alternative is equal to the real interest 
rate: 
 
[9] 0~  rrrp  
 
A conclusion is drawn that, if the overall integrated effect from the corporate and the personal 
tax is observed, in every case when the investment project is financed with external debt, the 
system will be neutral to the investment decision, ceteris paribus. The introduction of personal 
taxes do not affect these investments in a different way rather than the case of isolated 
application of the corporate tax, so it is evident that the „double“ taxation effect is not present 
here. 
 
3.2 CCT in equity-financed alterantives 
The implications of the conditions of classical system in this alternative is initially found in 
parameters γ and ρ: 
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Including these in term [6], the cost of capital will become: 
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And finally the investment tax wedge will transform to: 
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Accordingly, as stated in this case by Gruevski [7], “The effects from corporate taxation very 
often depend on the cross-effects from the personal taxation”. Expression [12] shows that the 
investment decision in this basic and most extended version of taxation of corporate income is 
determined largely from the inter-relation between the different personal tax rates (mi and md) 
 
and the corporate tax rate t. It is also self-evident, as we can see from the apsence of symbol 
z, that the effective personal tax rate on capital income is nonrelevant for the present model of 
taxation. The effect from „double“ taxation is quantified with the term (1 – mi)/(1 – t)(1 – md). 
Actually, it represents the combined corporate and personal income tax liability of the CCT, 
which may have variable values depending on  different dimenzions of the relevant tax rates 
imposed by the code. For example, if we take the actual situation in Macedonia, where mi = 
0% (0,00), md= 10% (0,10) and t = 10% (0,10), the combined tax liability would be 0,2345 or 
23,34% and with real interest rate of 10% (0,10) would yield an efective tax rate on investment 
of 0,0234 or 2,34%. If we assume that an interest income tax of 5% has been intoduced lately 
mi = 5% (0,05), than the combined tax liability would be 0,1728 or 17,28%, producing an 
efective tax rate on investment of 0,0172 or 1,72%. On the other hand, if the corporate and the 
divident tax are increased on 20% t = md= 20% (0,20) and mi = 0% (0,00), it is obvious that the 
investment tax wedge will additionally increase even on 0,0562 or 5,62%. In the following table 
some possible combinations of the relevant tax rates and the possible outcomes are presented 
and iterpreted in terms of the investment tax wedge coefficient. 
 
Table 1 Illustration of the possible combinations of tax rates and their effects on investment under the 
CCIT system 
Possible 
combination 
of tax rates 
Example Investme
nt tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = md = mi 10%, 10%, 10% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md = mi 20%, 10%, 10% 2,50% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md > mi 30%, 20%, 10% 6,07% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md < mi 20%, 10%, 28% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t > md < mi 10%,  5%, 30% -1,81% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
t = md > mi 20%, 20%, 10% 4,06% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = md < mi 10%, 10%, 19% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md < mi 10%, 10%, 30% -1,36% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
t = md = 0, mi    0%,  0%, 10% -1,00% stimulating subsidized favors equity distortive 
t = md, mi = 0 10%, 10%,  0% 2,34% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = mi, md = 0 10%, 10%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = 0, mi = md    0%, 10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md=mi= 0 0%,  0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
 
Of course, the Classical System of Corporation Tax could produce in theory some favourable 
outcomes, despite its infamous reputation. As we can see from Table 1, an incease in 
corporate and divident tax will generally increase liabilities and the burden on investment, while 
an increase in interest income tax will decrease tax obligations and vise versa. If the combined 
liability of the corporate and the dividend tax from the denominator is higher than the interest 
tax liability from the nominator, the investment tax wedge will be positive, with limiting, distortive 
effects on the equiy-financed investment. If this combined liability is equal to the interest tax 
 
liability, regardless the level of tax rates, the system will be neutral and indifferent concerning 
the investment decision.1 And in the third option, every time when the combined liability is less 
than the nominator, with no respect to the level of tax rates, the system will create favourable 
conditions, stimulating the equity-financed investments trough subsidization of the normal rate 
of the return. Usually, the authorities avoid the last condition in order to escape any additonal 
refunds, and the second one is unlikely to be found also. The circumstance that sustains a 
positive tax burden, actually represents a reflection of what is known as a true CCT system. 
So, the Classical Corporation Tax assumes a positive (non-zero) tax rates with a corporate 
income and a divident income tax equal or higher than the interest income tax and a right to 
the company to deduct the interest payments from the corporate income tax base. 
We may conclude that the CCT as we know it, produces in total, the highest amount of taxes 
paid on a single unit of corporate profit, entails double taxation, and possess a large distortive 
potential on corporate finance, but as mentioned, only if the interest payments are being 
continuousely deductible from the tax base and the tax rates met with the apropriate 
specifications. Under the conditions of Classical System, the normal return and the extra profit 
at its source and its destination are effectivelly streamed by the means of taxing regime. But if 
we put aside these limitations, certain advantages open some new frontiers and possibilities 
for the CCT. For instance, the incorporated principle of CCT for separate and independent 
taxation of company’s income enables the corporate tax from the first stage to act as a 
withholding barrier for the personal taxes imposed in the second stage. Another positive 
atribution is the simple tax structure. The CCT’s in-build simplicity without any complex rules 
for exempting flow-troughs of capital income raised the idea for the Classical Corporation Tax 
as a global mean of tax harmonization in an international contex. These present only a handfull 
of the positive features of CCT acknowledged from the literature (for more see Kari and Yla-
Liedenpohja, 2002). 
 
4. The Comprehensive Business Income Tax System (CBIT) 
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax System is the first analyzed model of taxation, 
fundamentally different from the classical approach. Originally proposed and promoted by the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s [8], the CBIT implements neutrality in the debt-equity choice in an 
antagonistic way. The concept of the CBIT is based on the idea to avoid the need for integration 
of corporate and shareholder level taxes by taxing the return to capital of corporations only 
once. Essentially, under the CBIT tax authorities allow no deduction of either interest payments 
or the return on equity from taxable corporate earnings. Moreover, as notified by Brys and 
Heady [9], “Except for the CBIT rate, no additional withholding taxes would be imposed on 
distributions to equity holders or on payments of interest”, thus implying the condition of (t, mi 
= 0, md = 0). As a result [10], „The corporation is therefore indifferent between debt, newly 
issued equity and retained earnings as source of finance of its investment under the CBIT“.  
 
4.1 CBIT in Debt Financing Alterantives  
First, we’ll resume the impact of eliminated deduction of interest payments from the corporate 
income tax base. The initial effect is loss of tax induced benefit of interest payments, and an 
increased cost of debt from r(1 – t) on only r. If we modify expression [7] according to this: 
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And integrate it in [4], the cost of capital will change in: 
 
                                                          
1 A positive burden can occur even when the relevant tax rates are identical (t = md = mi), a situation 
which is else known as „Flat Tax Rate system“ (see Raw 2 from Table 1). 
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The investment tax wedge will be: 
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Or more preciselly, if we calculate furtherlly: 
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As it can be seen from expression [16] the tax wedge is not zero as usual, but is identical with 
the wedge from the case of only corporate taxation of equity financed investment. Actually, 
with the imposed restriction on the interest payments deductability, the CBIT removes the 
induced advantage of debt, and creates equal prefference with equity. Equation [16] ilustrates 
the apsence of the personal tax rates whitin the process of taxation, which means that the 
profit is only taxed once at corporate level under the corporate tax rate t. The last is considered 
as a certain advatnage of CBIT, as the single time taxation of the whole profit at corporate level 
(which means at the source of profit), actually eliminates the need for the withholding function 
of the personal taxes.  
In our example, if the interest rate was estimated 10%, as we know, the usual treatment of 
debt investment would generate a zero tax burden. But under the CBIT, the same interest rate 
and a corporate tax rate of 10% would create tax liability of 0,1111 (11,11%) and a positive 
burden on investment of 0,0111 (1,11%).  
 
4.2 CBIT in Equity Finance Alterantives - With no Tax Credit Available,  
(t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0) 
 
Next, we illustrate the alternative of equity finance investment, without an available tax credit 
on divident distributions. As we said, after the initial taxation of the profit at corporate level, the 
CBIT does not impose any additional withholding taxes at personal level. The apsence of 
personal taxes imply value of unity for the tax discrimination variable (γ = 1), equalization of 
the shareholder’s discount rate with the real interest rate (ρ = r) and accordingly new equation 
for the cost of capital: 
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This will implicate the investment tax wedge as well: 
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It is obvious from expression [26] that the „double taxation“ effect is neutralized with the 
implementation of this system and the need for integration is effectivelly avoided.  
 
4.3 CBIT in Equity Finance Alterantives - With no Tax Credit Available,  
 
Version (t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0)  
 
Similar effect could be provided if the personal tax rates are equal and at the same time 
different from zero: 
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From the last we can conclude that the implememtation of CBIT not necesserally requires the 
conditionality of zero personal income tax rates, but rather the conditionality of equal 
(proportional) personal tax rates. Yet, this rare theoretical form is not popular, since it‘s not 
compatable with the principals of the CBIT system. 
 
4.4 CBIT in Equity Finance Alterantives – With a Tax Credit Available,  
(t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t) 
 
Although the purpose of CBIT is to distribute the burden evenly among the different sources 
of finance, the concept of „non-deductibility“ could create a certain preferences to equity only 
in the presence of a tax credit. Regardless that this combination, represents once again, only 
a theoretical possibility because of its contradictory nature, hypotetchically the effect is present 
and could be captured with a slight methodological modification. Therefore, if we incorporate 
plus the condition of c = t, than: 
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From here we can see that in this scenario the burden is zero, which is less than the positive 
burden of the investment covered with debt. 
Indeed, the method of taxation of interest payments really provides neutrality between the 
sources of finance, but also initiate some serious consquences majorly, for the „big lenders“ in 
capital market. As described by Brys and Heady [11], „A large part of total interest income is 
effectively not taxed in most countries – for instance because tax exempt institutional investors 
invest a large part of their portfolio in debt. The introduction of a corporate income tax on 
interest payments might then strongly increase the cost of debt finance for corporations. This 
not only will reduce the amount of investment projects that will be undertaken, but it might force 
 
corporations into bankruptcy. The CBIT might therefore require a rather low corporate income 
tax rate”. Accordingly, higher cost of debt is the leading limitation of this source-based form of 
tax. The taxation of interest income at the source will negatively impact investors which in 
compensation will require a higher before-tax rate of return such that, after imposing the CBIT, 
they’ll earn an after-tax return at least equal to the real interest rate. To relieve the situation, 
except the requirements for lower corporation tax rates, the officials might want to introduce 
the concept of CBIT gradually, phasing the implementation over a longer period of time. 
Another problematic issue is the inability of CBIT to secure equality among wage earners, 
which usually fall under the progressive tax rate schedule, and the self-employed, mostly 
treated under the CBIT’s proportional rate. To do so, the income of self-employed need to be 
separated into a capital income component and a labor income component, which is the 
procedure otherwise known as “income splitting”. However, [12], “The choice between capital 
income and labor income would therefore continue to be distorted under a CBIT system”, since 
they are independently treated under the two different taxing regimes. Additional critics are 
placed on the imposed level of burden and the way how CBIT taxes the profit rate as a whole. 
Namely, the level of tax burden is higher than the alternative systems with a gross return on 
debt and equity-financed investment fully taxed at the corporate tax rate. The last means that 
the economic rent including the normal rate of return are being effectively charged by the CBIT 
regime. In order to bring in some alleviation, at least for the normal return, the CBIT might be 
accompanied with a kind of relieving or incentive measure, for example, such as the immediate 
expensing of investment [13]. 
The summarizing Table 2 is a reminder of the possible efects from the CBIT system on 
investment. 
 
Table 2 Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT on investment 
CBIT 
 Variants 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects 
on cor-
porate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0 10%,   0%,  0% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferent neutral 
t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0 10%, 20%, 20% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferent neutral 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t 10%,   0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent  taxed 
only 
favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source Author’s calculations and interpretations 
At the finishing point, the effects from taxation on investment performance are summarized in 
Table 3, and the qualitative attributions of the analyzed basic model tax systems are given in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 3 The effects from taxation on investment performance 
Classical Corporation Income Tax System (CCT)  
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New equity issues: Basic model of CBIT without a tax 
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New equity issues:Model of non-zero rate CBIT without a 
tax credit (t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0) 







1
)1(
1
t
r
 
or 
)1( t
rt

 
New equity issues: Basic model of CBIT with a tax credit  
(t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t) 
0 
Source Summary and review of author’s calculations 
 
Table 4 Summary of qualitative attributions of basic model tax systems 
Model of 
tax 
system 
Effects on 
debt  
finance 
Effects on 
new equity 
finance 
Effects 
on 
econo-
mic rent 
Effects 
on 
normal 
return 
Withhold-
ing function 
criteria 
Location   
 specific 
criteria 
Overal 
alocation  
criteria 
 
 (CCT) 
 
favors 
 
discriminates 
 
taxed 
 
taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source & 
resi-
dence-
based 
 
distortive 
  
(CBIT) 
 
neutral 
(indifferent) 
 
neutral 
(indifferent) 
 
taxed 
 
taxed 
no 
withholding 
function at 
all 
 
source- 
based 
 
neutral 
Source Author’s interpretations 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we explored the properties of the Comprehensive Business Income Tax system, 
a proposal of the US Treasury Department for neutral corporate tax, accepted and promoted 
by the OECD. Under the classical corporation tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate 
level, corporate profits are distributed to the shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains 
or interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation at personal level. At the same time 
interest payments are deductible from the corporate income tax base. The consequence is 
imposition of “extra” burden on total corporate profit from its source to its destination. Since 
this is considered unfair and could distort the economic activity, the officials of the OECD 
proposed more appropriate “neutral” tax systems with abilities to sustain lower tax burden such 
as the CBIT system. Indeed, the performed examination of the properties of Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax System, through the applied methodology of EMTR, revealed 
satisfactory results in the terms of neutrality in contrast to the traditional Classical Corporation 
Tax, opening the possibilities for its alternative utilization. 
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